University of Kent >
School of Economics, University of Kent >
School of Economics Discussion Papers, University of Kent >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
| || |
|Title:||Health systems, inequality and incentives to innovate |
García-Alonso, María D. C.
|Issue Date:||2009 |
|Series/Report no.:||School of Economics discussion papers 09,02|
|Abstract:||Governments often subsidize poorer groups in society to ensure their access to new drugs. We analyze here the optimal income-based price subsidies in a strategic environment. We show that asymmetric health systems can arise even though countries are ex-ante symmetric when international price discrimination is possible. Universal access is less likely to arise without price discrimination but also health policy coordination becomes more important. This is due to the multiple equilibria which make the attainment of universal coverage within a given income range ambiguous. We also show that an increase in intra-country inequality does not always lead to less likely universal coverage when international price discrimination is possible.|
income based subsidies
|Document Type:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||School of Economics Discussion Papers, University of Kent|
Download bibliographical data as:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.