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dc.contributor.authorAcharyya, Rajaten_US
dc.contributor.authorGarcía-Alonso, María del Carmenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-21T16:52:45Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-21T16:52:45Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50577-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a policy game between a high-income country hosting a drug innovator and a low-income country hosting a drug imitator. The low-income country chooses whether to enforce an International Patent Regime (strict IPR) or not (weak IPR) and the high-income country chooses whether to allow parallel imports (PI) of on-patent drugs or market based discrimination (MBD). We show that, for a moderately high imitation cost, both (Strict IPR, Parallel Imports) and (Weak IPR, MBD) emerge as the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) policy choices. For relatively smaller imitation costs, (Weak IPR, MBD) is the unique SPNE policy choice. The welfare properties reveal that although innovation may be higher at the (Strict IPR, PI), the market coverage and national welfare of the low-income country, and the total welfare are all lower. This opens up the efficiency issue of implementing TRIPS and at the same time allowing international exhaustion of patent rights.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. of Kent, School of Economics Canterburyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSchool of Economics discussion papers 09,19en_US
dc.subject.jelD4en_US
dc.subject.jelL1en_US
dc.subject.jelI1en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpatent protectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordTRIPSen_US
dc.subject.keywordinnovationen_US
dc.subject.keywordimitationen_US
dc.subject.keywordparallel importsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpharmaceuticalsen_US
dc.subject.stwPatentrechten_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwPharmazeutische Forschungen_US
dc.subject.stwInnovationen_US
dc.subject.stwImitationswettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleWeak IPR and imitation in the south and international exhaustion of patent rights in the north for innovated drugs: A policy gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn611462044en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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