Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50537
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dc.contributor.authorCasajus, Andréen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-13en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-14T11:30:13Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-14T11:30:13Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50537-
dc.description.abstractWe resolve redundancies in the characterizations of the Banzhaf value suggested by Haller (1994, Int J Game Theory 23, 261-281) and Malawski (2002, Int J Game Theory 31:47-67). In particular, we show that the collusion properties employed by them are equivalent. Combined with the dummy player axiom, any of the collusion properties has strong symmetry implications whenever the cardinality of the player set exceeds two. Finally, we establish that the Banzhaf value is non-redundantly characterized by the dummy player axiom and any of the collusion properties, provided that the player set is as above.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cLeipzigen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper // Universität Leipzig |x99en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBanzhaf valueen_US
dc.subject.keywordsymmetryen_US
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordproxyen_US
dc.subject.keywordassociationen_US
dc.subject.keyworddistrusten_US
dc.titleCollusion, symmetry, and the Banzhaf valueen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn669843172en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:leiwps:99-

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