Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50488
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dc.contributor.authorMönnich, Christinaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-06T16:32:09Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-06T16:32:09Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50488-
dc.description.abstractAt the Uruguay Round, tariff rate quotas (TRQs) were intended to serve two purposes: first, to prevent that tariffication would lead – at least on the short term – to a deterioration of market access and second, to create new, minimum market access. The since then observed fill rates do not match with these intentions, being often rather low. A wide-held suspicion explains this with tariff quota administration imposing an extra barrier to trade. It is the aim of this paper to test whether different administrative methods do indeed contribute to explain variation in fill rates and if so, how. A censored regression model for panel data was developed and applied to the EU’s TRQs for the years 1995–2000. The data supported the presumption that administration matters, sometimes in surprising ways.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aJustus-Liebig-Univ., ZEU |cGiessenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionsbeiträge // Zentrum für internationale Entwicklungs- und Umweltforschung |x16en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwAußenhandelskontingenten_US
dc.subject.stwAgrarzollen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzverwaltungen_US
dc.subject.stwZollpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwAgrarprotektionismusen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleTariff rate quotas: Does administration matter?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn823273008en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zeudps:26465-

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