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dc.contributor.authorDam, Lammertjanen
dc.contributor.authorKoetter, Michaelen
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-02-
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-29T15:46:15Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-29T15:46:15Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86558-735-0en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50000-
dc.description.abstractTo test if safety nets create moral hazard in the banking industry, we develop a simultaneous structural two-equations model that specifies the probability of a bailout and banks' risk taking.We identify the effect of expected bailout probabilities on risk taking using exclusion restrictions based on regional political, supervisor, and banking market traits. The sample includes all observed capital preservation measures and distressed exits in the German banking industry during 1995-2006. The marginal effect of risk with respect to bailout expectations is 7.2 basis points. A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviations increases the probability of official distress from 6.2% to 9.9%. Only interventions directly targeting bank management and, to a lesser extent, penalties mitigate moral hazard. Weak interventions, such as warnings, do not reduce moral hazard.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsche Bundesbank |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper Series 2 |x2011,10en
dc.subject.jelC30en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelG28en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBankingen
dc.subject.keywordsupervisionen
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden
dc.subject.keywordinterventionen
dc.subject.keywordbailoutsen
dc.subject.stwBankrisikoen
dc.subject.stwSchuldenübernahmeen
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwBankenaufsichten
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleBank bailouts, interventions, and moral hazard-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn667625526en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bubdp2:201110en

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