|
EconStor >
Freie Universität Berlin >
Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Freie Universität Berlin >
Diskussionsbeiträge, FB Wirtschaftswissenschaft, FU Berlin >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49923
|
| | |
| Title: | | How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?  |
| Authors: | | Berger, Helge Müller, Till |
| Issue Date: | | 2004 |
| Series/Report no.: | | School of Business & Economics Discussion Paper: Economics 2004/20 |
| Abstract: | | The likely extension of the euro area has triggered a debate on the organization of the ECB, in particular on the apparent mismatch between relative economic size and voting rights in the Council. We present a simple model of optimal representation in a federal central bank addressing this question. Optimal voting weights reflect two opposing forces: the wish to insulate common monetary policy from changing preferences at the national level, and the attempt to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economic shocks. A perfect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal, and neither is the one country, one vote principle. Empirically, there are indications that the pattern of over- and under-representation of member countries in the ECB Council might be extreme by the standards of the US Fed and German Bundesbank and not always optimal. |
| Subjects: | | Central Bank Federal Central Bank currency union optimal representation voting ECB |
| JEL: | | D72 E52 E58 F33 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Diskussionsbeiträge, FB Wirtschaftswissenschaft, FU Berlin
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49923
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|