Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49920
Authors: 
Schöb, Ronnie
Thum, Marcel
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
School of Business & Economics Discussion Paper: Economics 2011/14
Abstract: 
Individual labour productivities are often unobservable for firms when hiring new workers. Job protection may prevent firms ex post from using information about labour productivities. We show that a binding minimum wage introduced in the presence of job protection will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and full information.
Subjects: 
Minimum wages
unemployment
hidden information
labour market regulation
JEL: 
J2
J3
H5
L5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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