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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49886
  

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dc.contributor.authorHarrington, Joseph E.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-27T15:21:19Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-27T15:21:19Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49886-
dc.description.abstractA corporate leniency program provides relief from government penalties to the first member of a cartel to come forward and cooperate with the authorities. This study explores the incentives to apply for leniency when each cartel member has private information as to the likelihood that the competition authority will be able to convict them without a cooperating firm. A firm may apply for leniency because it fears being convicted or because it fears another firm will apply. Policies by the competition authority to magnify concerns about pre-emption - and thereby induce greater use of the leniency program - are explored.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherJohns Hopkins Univ., Dep. of Economics Baltimore, Md.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers // the Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics 573en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleCorporate leniency with private information: The push of prosecution and the pull of pre-emptionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn644137215en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University

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