Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49871
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dc.contributor.authorHarrington, Joseph Emmetten_US
dc.contributor.authorSkrzypacz, Andrzejen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-27T15:21:06Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-27T15:21:06Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49871-
dc.description.abstractMotivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms' prices and quantities are private information. Conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports. The properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements used in a number of markets including citric acid, lysine, and vitamins.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aJohns Hopkins Univ., Dep. of Economics |cBaltimore, Md.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking papers // the Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics |x555en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titlePrivate monitoring and communication in cartels: Explaining recent collusive practicesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn607470526en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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