EconStor >
The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. >
Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University >
Working Papers, Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49871
  
Title:Private monitoring and communication in cartels: Explaining recent collusive practices PDF Logo
Authors:Harrington, Joseph Emmett
Skrzypacz, Andrzej
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Working papers // the Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics 555
Abstract:Motivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms' prices and quantities are private information. Conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports. The properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements used in a number of markets including citric acid, lysine, and vitamins.
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
607470526.pdf349.48 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49871

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.