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CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49698
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Nosenzo, Daniele | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Sefton, Martin | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-11-18 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-09-26T13:24:30Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-09-26T13:24:30Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49698 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)'s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and also to the extent to which players care about payoff inequalities. We then report a laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the two extended games: subjects avoid the detrimental move order of Varian's model, where a person with a high value of the public good commits to a low contribution, and instead players tend to delay contributions. These results suggest that commitment opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CEDEX Nottingham | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CeDEx discussion paper series 2010-14 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C92 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | public goods | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | voluntary contributions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | sequential contributions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | endogenous timing | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | action commitment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | observable delay | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | experiment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Öffentliches Gut | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spende | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Test | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Endogenous move structure and voluntary provision of public goods: Theory and experiment | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 640170293 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham
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