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dc.contributor.authorNosenzo, Danieleen_US
dc.contributor.authorSefton, Martinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:30Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:30Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49698-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)'s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and also to the extent to which players care about payoff inequalities. We then report a laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the two extended games: subjects avoid the detrimental move order of Varian's model, where a person with a high value of the public good commits to a low contribution, and instead players tend to delay contributions. These results suggest that commitment opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCEDEX Nottinghamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCeDEx discussion paper series 2010-14en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordvoluntary contributionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordsequential contributionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordendogenous timingen_US
dc.subject.keywordaction commitmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordobservable delayen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwSpendeen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleEndogenous move structure and voluntary provision of public goods: Theory and experimenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640170293en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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