EconStor >
The University of Nottingham >
Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), The University of Nottingham >
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49698
  
Title:Endogenous move structure and voluntary provision of public goods: Theory and experiment PDF Logo
Authors:Nosenzo, Daniele
Sefton, Martin
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:CeDEx discussion paper series 2010-14
Abstract:In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)'s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and also to the extent to which players care about payoff inequalities. We then report a laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the two extended games: subjects avoid the detrimental move order of Varian's model, where a person with a high value of the public good commits to a low contribution, and instead players tend to delay contributions. These results suggest that commitment opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought.
Subjects:public goods
voluntary contributions
sequential contributions
endogenous timing
action commitment
observable delay
experiment
JEL:H41
C72
C92
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
640170293.pdf994.61 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49698

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.