Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49698 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-14
Publisher: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Abstract: 
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)'s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and also to the extent to which players care about payoff inequalities. We then report a laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the two extended games: subjects avoid the detrimental move order of Varian's model, where a person with a high value of the public good commits to a low contribution, and instead players tend to delay contributions. These results suggest that commitment opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought.
Subjects: 
public goods
voluntary contributions
sequential contributions
endogenous timing
action commitment
observable delay
experiment
JEL: 
H41
C72
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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