Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49696
Authors: 
Gächter, Simon
Nosenzo, Daniele
Renner, Elke
Sefton, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx discussion paper series 2009-19
Abstract: 
We examine the characteristics of effective leaders in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We focus on two factors: the individual's cooperativeness and the individual's beliefs about the cooperativeness of others. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are cooperatively inclined. Partly this reflects a false consensus effect: cooperative leaders are more optimistic than non-cooperators about the cooperativeness of followers. However, cooperative leaders contribute more than non-cooperative leaders even after controlling for optimism. We conclude that differing leader contributions by differing types of leader in large part reflects social motivations
JEL: 
A13
C92
D03
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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