Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49691
Authors: 
Montero, Maria
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx discussion paper series 2010-19
Abstract: 
It is well known that proposers have an advantage in the canonical model of bargaining in legislatures: proposers are sure of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in a coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper I show that, if parties differ in voting weight, it is possible for a party to donate part of its proposing probability to another party and be better-off as a result. This can happen even if the recipient never includes the donor in its proposals. Even though actually being the proposer is valuable, having a higher probability of being proposer may be harmful.
Subjects: 
legislative bargaining
weighted majority games
voting paradoxes
JEL: 
C78
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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