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dc.contributor.authorMontero, Mariaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:24Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:24Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49691-
dc.description.abstractIt is well known that proposers have an advantage in the canonical model of bargaining in legislatures: proposers are sure of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in a coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper I show that, if parties differ in voting weight, it is possible for a party to donate part of its proposing probability to another party and be better-off as a result. This can happen even if the recipient never includes the donor in its proposals. Even though actually being the proposer is valuable, having a higher probability of being proposer may be harmful.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCEDEX Nottinghamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCeDEx discussion paper series 2010-19en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordlegislative bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordweighted majority gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordvoting paradoxesen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwGesetzgebungen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungsmachten_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleBargaining in legislatures: A new donation paradoxen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640943071en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham

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