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Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), The University of Nottingham >
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49691
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Montero, Maria | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-12-02 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-09-26T13:24:24Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-09-26T13:24:24Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49691 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | It is well known that proposers have an advantage in the canonical model of bargaining in legislatures: proposers are sure of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in a coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper I show that, if parties differ in voting weight, it is possible for a party to donate part of its proposing probability to another party and be better-off as a result. This can happen even if the recipient never includes the donor in its proposals. Even though actually being the proposer is valuable, having a higher probability of being proposer may be harmful. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CEDEX Nottingham | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CeDEx discussion paper series 2010-19 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C78 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | legislative bargaining | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | weighted majority games | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | voting paradoxes | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wahlverhalten | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gesetzgebung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verhandlungsmacht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Bargaining in legislatures: A new donation paradox | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 640943071 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham
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