Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49690 
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dc.contributor.authorNosenzo, Danieleen
dc.contributor.authorOfferman, Theoen
dc.contributor.authorSefton, Martinen
dc.contributor.authorvan der Veen, Ailkoen
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:23Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:23Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49690-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the effectiveness of bonuses and fines in an inspection game where an employer can learn the effort of a worker through costly inspection. Standard game theoretic analysis predicts that fines discourage shirking, whereas bonuses encourage shirking. In contrast, ownpayoff effects suggest that both fines and bonuses discourage shirking. In an experiment we find that fines are more effective than bonuses in reducing shirking. However, we do not find that bonuses encourage shirking. Behavioral theories based on Impulse Balance Equilibrium or Quantal Response Equilibrium provide a good account of deviations from Nash equilibrium predictions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) |cNottinghamen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeDEx Discussion Paper Series |x2010-21en
dc.subject.jelC70en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinspection gamesen
dc.subject.keywordcostly monitoringen
dc.subject.keywordrewards and punishmentsen
dc.subject.keywordbonuses and finesen
dc.subject.keywordquantal response equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordimpulse balance equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.titleInducing good behavior: Bonuses versus fines in inspection games-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn65571488Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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