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dc.contributor.authorBayer, Ralph-C.en_US
dc.contributor.authorRenner, Elkeen_US
dc.contributor.authorSausgruber, Ruperten_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:18Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:18Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49685-
dc.description.abstractWe use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay of contributions in standard public goods games cannot be fully explained by reinforcement learning. According to our estimates, learning only accounts for 41 percent of the decay in contributions in standard public goods games. The contribution dynamics of subjects, who are identified as conditional cooperators, differ strongly from the learning dynamics, while a learning model estimated from the limited information treatment tracks behavior for subjects, who cannot be classified as conditional cooperators, reasonably well.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCEDEX Nottinghamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCeDEx discussion paper series 2009-18en_US
dc.subject.jelC90en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goods experimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordlearningen_US
dc.subject.keywordlimited informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordconfusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordconditional cooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwLernenen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleConfusion and reinforcement learning in experimental public goods gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn613131320en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham

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