Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49681
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dc.contributor.authorGächter, Simonen_US
dc.contributor.authorRenner, Elkeen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:13Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:13Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49681-
dc.description.abstractBelief elicitation is an important methodological issue for experimental economists. There are two generic questions: 1) Do incentives increase belief accuracy? 2) Are there interaction effects of beliefs and decisions? We investigate these questions in the case of finitely repeated public goods experiments. We find that belief accuracy is significantly higher when beliefs are incentivized. The relationship between contributions and beliefs is slightly steeper under incentives. However, we find that incentivized beliefs tend to lead to higher contribution levels than either non-incentivized beliefs or no beliefs at all. We discuss the implications of our results for the design of public good experiments.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCEDEX |cNottinghamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeDEx discussion paper series |x2010-12en_US
dc.subject.jelC90en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordbeliefsen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimental methodologyen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwMeinungen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleThe effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experimentsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn632213981en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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