Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49681 
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dc.contributor.authorGächter, Simonen
dc.contributor.authorRenner, Elkeen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-03-
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:13Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:13Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49681-
dc.description.abstractBelief elicitation is an important methodological issue for experimental economists. There are two generic questions: 1) Do incentives increase belief accuracy? 2) Are there interaction effects of beliefs and decisions? We investigate these questions in the case of finitely repeated public goods experiments. We find that belief accuracy is significantly higher when beliefs are incentivized. The relationship between contributions and beliefs is slightly steeper under incentives. However, we find that incentivized beliefs tend to lead to higher contribution levels than either non-incentivized beliefs or no beliefs at all. We discuss the implications of our results for the design of public good experiments.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) |cNottinghamen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeDEx Discussion Paper Series |x2010-12en
dc.subject.jelC90en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen
dc.subject.keywordbeliefsen
dc.subject.keywordexperimental methodologyen
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen
dc.subject.stwMeinungen
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleThe effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn632213981en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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