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dc.contributor.authorSousa, Sergioen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:10Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:10Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49677-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the efficacy of a punishment mechanism in promoting cooperative behaviour in a public goods game when enforcement of punishment is uncertain. Experimental studies have found that a sanctioning system can induce individuals to adopt behaviour deemed as socially acceptable. Yet, our experiment shows that a sanctioning system cannot promote cooperative behaviour if enforcement is a low-probability event and free-riding behaviour is not often punished. This supports the view that punishment needs to be exercised to be feared, otherwise the simple threat of it cannot be effective in promoting cooperation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCEDEX Nottinghamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCeDEx discussion paper series 2010-06en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworduncertain enforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic good gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordaltruistic punishmenten_US
dc.subject.keyworddecisionmaking under uncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordcooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwKooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen_US
dc.subject.stwStrafeen_US
dc.titleCooperation and punishment under uncertain enforcementen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn632210672en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham

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