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dc.contributor.authorDrouvelis, Michalisen_US
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Wielanden_US
dc.contributor.authorPossajennikov, Alexen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:09Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:09Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49676-
dc.description.abstractThe common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender's type, the long-run behavior without an induced common prior is shown to be different from the behavior when a common prior is induced, while for other distributions behavior is similar under both regimes. We also present a learning model that allows players to learn about the other players' strategies and the prior distribution of the sender's type. We show that this learning model accurately accounts for all main features of the data.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCEDEX Nottinghamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCeDEx discussion paper series 2009-08en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcommon prioren_US
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordlearningen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwStatistische Verteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwLernenen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSignaling without common prior: An experimenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn598708367en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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