EconStor >
The University of Nottingham >
Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), The University of Nottingham >
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49676
  
Title:Signaling without common prior: An experiment PDF Logo
Authors:Drouvelis, Michalis
Müller, Wieland
Possajennikov, Alex
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:CeDEx discussion paper series 2009-08
Abstract:The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender's type, the long-run behavior without an induced common prior is shown to be different from the behavior when a common prior is induced, while for other distributions behavior is similar under both regimes. We also present a learning model that allows players to learn about the other players' strategies and the prior distribution of the sender's type. We show that this learning model accurately accounts for all main features of the data.
Subjects:common prior
signaling
experiment
learning
JEL:C72
C92
D83
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
598708367.pdf1.03 MBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49676

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.