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Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), The University of Nottingham >
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49675
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Gächter, Simon | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kessler, Esther | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Königstein, Manfred | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-06-21 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-09-26T13:24:08Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-09-26T13:24:08Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49675 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit incentives affect cooperation. We first show that there is substantial cooperation under non-incentive compatible contracts. Incentive-compatible contracts induce best-reply effort and crowd out any voluntary cooperation. Further experiments show that this result is robust to two important variables: experiencing Trust contracts without any incentives and implicit incentives coming from repeated interaction. Implicit incentives have a strong positive effect on effort only under non-incentive compatible contracts. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CEDEX Nottingham | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CeDEx discussion paper series 2011-06 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C70 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C90 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | principal-agent games | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | gift-exchange experiments | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | incomplete contracts, explicit incentives | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | implicit incentives | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | repeated games | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | separability | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | experiments | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The roles of incentives and voluntary cooperation for contractual compliance | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 662542150 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham
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