Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49674 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2009-03
Publisher: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Abstract: 
We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency.
Subjects: 
laboratory experiments
rent-seeking, conflict
group competitiveness
JEL: 
C90
D72
D74
F51
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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