Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49674 
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dc.contributor.authorAbbink, Klausen
dc.contributor.authorBrandts, Jordien
dc.contributor.authorHerrmann, Benedikten
dc.contributor.authorOrzen, Henriken
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:07Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:07Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49674-
dc.description.abstractWe study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) |cNottinghamen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeDEx Discussion Paper Series |x2009-03en
dc.subject.jelC90en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelF51en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordlaboratory experimentsen
dc.subject.keywordrent-seeking, conflicten
dc.subject.keywordgroup competitivenessen
dc.subject.stwInteressengruppentheorieen
dc.subject.stwKonflikten
dc.subject.stwKostenen
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.titleInter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn591243385en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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