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dc.contributor.authorAbbink, Klausen_US
dc.contributor.authorBrandts, Jordien_US
dc.contributor.authorHerrmann, Benedikten_US
dc.contributor.authorOrzen, Henriken_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:07Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:07Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49674-
dc.description.abstractWe study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCEDEX Nottinghamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCeDEx discussion paper series 2009-03en_US
dc.subject.jelC90en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelF51en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordlaboratory experimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordrent-seeking, conflicten_US
dc.subject.keywordgroup competitivenessen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressengruppentheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwKonflikten_US
dc.subject.stwKostenen_US
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleInter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn591243385en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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