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Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), The University of Nottingham >
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49674
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Abbink, Klaus | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Brandts, Jordi | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Herrmann, Benedikt | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Orzen, Henrik | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-09-26T13:24:07Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-09-26T13:24:07Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49674 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CEDEX Nottingham | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CeDEx discussion paper series 2009-03 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C90 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D74 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F51 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | laboratory experiments | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | rent-seeking, conflict | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | group competitiveness | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Interessengruppentheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Konflikt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kosten | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Rent Seeking | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 591243385 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham
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