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dc.contributor.authorAbeler, Johannesen
dc.contributor.authorAltmann, Steffenen
dc.contributor.authorKube, Sebastianen
dc.contributor.authorWibral, Matthiasen
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:05Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:05Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49672-
dc.description.abstractWe study how different payment modes inuence the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract enforcement device. In particular, we analyze how horizontal fairness concerns affect performance and efficiency in an environment characterized by contractual incompleteness. In our experiment, one principal is matched with two agents. The principal pays equal wages in one treatment and can set individual wages in the other. We find that the use of equal wages elicits substantially lower efforts. This is not caused by monetary incentives per se since under both wage schemes it is profit-maximizing for agents to exert high efforts. The treatment difference instead seems to be driven by the fact that the norm of equity is violated far more frequently in the equal wage treatment. After having suffered from violations of the equity principle, agents withdraw effort. These findings hold even after controlling for the role of intentions, as we show in a third treatment. Our results suggest that adherence to the norm of equity is a necessary prerequisite for successful establishment of gift-exchange relations.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) |cNottinghamen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeDEx Discussion Paper Series |x2009-11en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelJ41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordwage settingen
dc.subject.keywordwage equalityen
dc.subject.keywordequityen
dc.subject.keywordgift exchangeen
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen
dc.subject.keywordincomplete contractsen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsbeziehungenen
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleGift exchange and workers' fairness concerns: When equality is unfair-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn604463448en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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