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dc.contributor.authorAbeler, Johannesen_US
dc.contributor.authorAltmann, Steffenen_US
dc.contributor.authorKube, Sebastianen_US
dc.contributor.authorWibral, Matthiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:05Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:05Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49672-
dc.description.abstractWe study how different payment modes inuence the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract enforcement device. In particular, we analyze how horizontal fairness concerns affect performance and efficiency in an environment characterized by contractual incompleteness. In our experiment, one principal is matched with two agents. The principal pays equal wages in one treatment and can set individual wages in the other. We find that the use of equal wages elicits substantially lower efforts. This is not caused by monetary incentives per se since under both wage schemes it is profit-maximizing for agents to exert high efforts. The treatment difference instead seems to be driven by the fact that the norm of equity is violated far more frequently in the equal wage treatment. After having suffered from violations of the equity principle, agents withdraw effort. These findings hold even after controlling for the role of intentions, as we show in a third treatment. Our results suggest that adherence to the norm of equity is a necessary prerequisite for successful establishment of gift-exchange relations.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCEDEX Nottinghamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCeDEx discussion paper series 2009-11en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordwage settingen_US
dc.subject.keywordwage equalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordequityen_US
dc.subject.keywordgift exchangeen_US
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordincomplete contractsen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsbeziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen_US
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleGift exchange and workers' fairness concerns: When equality is unfairen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn604463448en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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