Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49671
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Pingen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:04Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:04Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49671-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize pure strategy equilibria of common value multi-unit uniform price auctions under the framework of initial public offerings, where bidders have incomplete private information regarding the value of shares and submit discrete demand schedules. We show that there exists a continuum of equilibria where investors with a higher expectation about the value of shares bid for higher quantities at higher prices, and as a result the market price increases with the market value. The collusive equilibria, in which investors place bids regardless of their expectation about the value, are obtained under stricter conditions than in the continuous price case.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCEDEX |cNottinghamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeDEx discussion paper series |x2009-05en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelG12en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordIPO, uniform price auctionen_US
dc.subject.keyworddivisible goods auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordshare auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordtacit collusionen_US
dc.subject.stwWertpapieremissionen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwCapital Asset Pricing Modelen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCharacterization of pure strategy equilibria in uniform price IPO auctionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn594933692en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

Files in This Item:
File
Size
991.51 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.