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dc.contributor.authorZhang, Pingen_US
dc.description.abstractWe characterize pure strategy equilibria of common value multi-unit uniform price auctions under the framework of initial public offerings, where bidders have incomplete private information regarding the value of shares and submit discrete demand schedules. We show that there exists a continuum of equilibria where investors with a higher expectation about the value of shares bid for higher quantities at higher prices, and as a result the market price increases with the market value. The collusive equilibria, in which investors place bids regardless of their expectation about the value, are obtained under stricter conditions than in the continuous price case.en_US
dc.publisherCEDEX Nottinghamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCeDEx discussion paper series 2009-05en_US
dc.subject.keywordIPO, uniform price auctionen_US
dc.subject.keyworddivisible goods auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordshare auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordtacit collusionen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwCapital Asset Pricing Modelen_US
dc.titleCharacterization of pure strategy equilibria in uniform price IPO auctionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham

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