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dc.contributor.authorAnesi, Vincenten_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:03Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:03Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49670-
dc.description.abstractWith the changing economic circumstances confronting their countries, regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem, important aspects of which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about the costs of secession for her community. This paper shows that this uncertainty is a central cause of secession, using a model which incorporates both policies to appease secessionist aspirations and informational asymmetries. In a situation of asymmetric information, in which the policy-maker is better informed about the consequences of separation than the minority leader, signaling incentives make secession the unique equilibrium outcome, whether mutually advantageous compromises exist or not. We also show that the ruling majority may seek to maintain political unity by pre-committing to minority protection rules which prevent bluffing by the informed policy-maker. Additionally, the model generates comparative statics results on the question of which states are most likely to adopt constitutional rules protecting the minorities living within their borders.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCEDEX Nottinghamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCeDEx discussion paper series 2010-15en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordconstitutional commitmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordsecessionen_US
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen_US
dc.subject.keywordregional redistributionen_US
dc.subject.stwMinderheiten_US
dc.subject.stwRegionale Konzentrationen_US
dc.subject.stwMinderheitenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwSeparatismusen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSecessionism and minority protection in an uncertain worlden_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640170870en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham

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