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dc.contributor.authorGächter, Simonen_US
dc.contributor.authorHerrmann, Benedikten_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:02Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:02Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49669-
dc.description.abstractWe report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we onducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban-rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. An important reason is that there is punishment of contributors in all four subject pools. Thus, punishment can also undermine the scope for self-governance in the sense of high levels of voluntary cooperation that are sustained by sanctioning free riders only.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCEDEX Nottinghamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCeDEx discussion paper series 2010-05en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial normsen_US
dc.subject.keywordfree ridingen_US
dc.subject.keywordmisdirected punishmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwKooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Normen_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwRusslanden_US
dc.titleThe limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russiaen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn632210303en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham

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