EconStor >
The University of Nottingham >
Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), The University of Nottingham >
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49669
  
Title:The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia PDF Logo
Authors:Gächter, Simon
Herrmann, Benedikt
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:CeDEx discussion paper series 2010-05
Abstract:We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we onducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban-rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. An important reason is that there is punishment of contributors in all four subject pools. Thus, punishment can also undermine the scope for self-governance in the sense of high levels of voluntary cooperation that are sustained by sanctioning free riders only.
Subjects:social norms
free riding
misdirected punishment
experiments
JEL:H41
C91
D23
C72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
632210303.pdf1.01 MBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49669

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.