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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Bardsley, Nicholas | en |
dc.contributor.author | Mehta, Judith | en |
dc.contributor.author | Starmer, Chris | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sugden, Robert | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-09-26T13:23:55Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-09-26T13:23:55Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49663 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players' pre-reflective inclinations towards the relevant strategies; the theory of team reasoning explains it as the result of the players' using a non-standard form of reasoning. We report two experiments. One finds strong support for team reasoning; the other supports cognitive hierarchy theory. In the light of additional questionnaire evidence, we conclude that players' reasoning is sensitive to the decision context. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aThe University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) |cNottingham | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCeDEx Discussion Paper Series |x2008-17 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C92 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | salience | en |
dc.subject.keyword | focal point | en |
dc.subject.keyword | cognitive hierarchy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | team reasoning | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kognition | en |
dc.title | Explaining focal points: Cognitive hierarchy theory versus team reasoning | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 589213350 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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