Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49663 
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dc.contributor.authorBardsley, Nicholasen
dc.contributor.authorMehta, Judithen
dc.contributor.authorStarmer, Chrisen
dc.contributor.authorSugden, Roberten
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:23:55Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:23:55Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49663-
dc.description.abstractThis paper reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players' pre-reflective inclinations towards the relevant strategies; the theory of team reasoning explains it as the result of the players' using a non-standard form of reasoning. We report two experiments. One finds strong support for team reasoning; the other supports cognitive hierarchy theory. In the light of additional questionnaire evidence, we conclude that players' reasoning is sensitive to the decision context.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) |cNottinghamen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeDEx Discussion Paper Series |x2008-17en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordsalienceen
dc.subject.keywordfocal pointen
dc.subject.keywordcognitive hierarchyen
dc.subject.keywordteam reasoningen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwKognitionen
dc.titleExplaining focal points: Cognitive hierarchy theory versus team reasoning-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn589213350en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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