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dc.contributor.authorBardsley, Nicholasen_US
dc.contributor.authorMehta, Judithen_US
dc.contributor.authorStarmer, Chrisen_US
dc.contributor.authorSugden, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:23:55Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:23:55Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49663-
dc.description.abstractThis paper reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players' pre-reflective inclinations towards the relevant strategies; the theory of team reasoning explains it as the result of the players' using a non-standard form of reasoning. We report two experiments. One finds strong support for team reasoning; the other supports cognitive hierarchy theory. In the light of additional questionnaire evidence, we conclude that players' reasoning is sensitive to the decision context.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCEDEX Nottinghamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCeDEx discussion paper series 2008-17en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordsalienceen_US
dc.subject.keywordfocal pointen_US
dc.subject.keywordcognitive hierarchyen_US
dc.subject.keywordteam reasoningen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwKognitionen_US
dc.titleExplaining focal points: Cognitive hierarchy theory versus team reasoningen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn589213350en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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