Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49662
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dc.contributor.authorDufwenberg, Martinen_US
dc.contributor.authorGächter, Simonen_US
dc.contributor.authorHennig-Schmidt, Heikeen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:23:55Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:23:55Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49662-
dc.description.abstractPsychological game theory can provide rational-choice-based framing effects; frames influence beliefs, beliefs influence motivations. We explain this theoretically and explore empirical relevance experimentally. In a 2×2 design of one-shot public good games we show that frames affect subject's first- and second-order beliefs, and contributions. From a psychological gametheoretic framework we derive two mutually compatible hypotheses about guilt aversion and reciprocity under which contributions are related to second- and first-order beliefs, respectively. Our results are consistent with either.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCEDEX |cNottinghamen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeDEx discussion paper series |x2010-16en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.jelZ13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordframingen_US
dc.subject.keywordpsychological game theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordguilt aversionen_US
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic good gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordvoluntary cooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwFramingen_US
dc.subject.stwPsychologieen_US
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleThe framing of games and the psychology of playen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640171745en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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