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dc.contributor.authorSiemens, Ferdinand vonen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-14T13:14:05Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-14T13:14:05Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49527-
dc.description.abstractEmpirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting control can reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differ in their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not being controlled might then be considered to be kind, because not everybody reciprocates not being controlled with high effort. This argument stands in contrast to existing theoretical wisdom on motivational crowding-out that is primarily based on signaling models.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Behavioural Economics 3553en_US
dc.subject.jelA13en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelL20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordextrinsic and intrinsic motivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcrowding-outen_US
dc.subject.keywordintention-based reciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordincomplete informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordhidden costs of controlen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsbeurteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en_US
dc.subject.stwCrowding outen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleIntention-based reciprocity and the hidden costs of controlen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn667829091en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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