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Title:Intention-based reciprocity and the hidden costs of control PDF Logo
Authors:Siemens, Ferdinand von
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Behavioural Economics 3553
Abstract:Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting control can reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differ in their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not being controlled might then be considered to be kind, because not everybody reciprocates not being controlled with high effort. This argument stands in contrast to existing theoretical wisdom on motivational crowding-out that is primarily based on signaling models.
Subjects:extrinsic and intrinsic motivation
crowding-out
intention-based reciprocity
incomplete information
hidden costs of control
JEL:A13
C70
D63
D82
L20
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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