|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49515
|
| | |
| Title: | | Wage dispersion and labor turnover with adverse selection  |
| Authors: | | Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos Kaas, Leo |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Labour Markets 3562 |
| Abstract: | | We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it gradually over time. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and hire all types of workers in equilibrium, whereas high-wage firms offer pooling contracts designed to retain high-ability workers only. Low-ability workers have higher turnover rates, they are more often employed in low-wage firms and face an earnings distribution with a higher frictional component. Furthermore, positive sorting obtains in equilibrium. |
| Subjects: | | adverse selection on-the-job search wage dispersion sorting |
| JEL: | | D82 J63 J64 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49515
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|