|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49486
|
| | |
| Title: | | Social ideology and taxes in a differentiated candidates framework  |
| Authors: | | Krasa, Stefan Polborn, Mattias |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3503 |
| Abstract: | | How does ideological polarization on non-economic matters influence the size of government? We analyze this question using a differentiated candidates framework: Two office-motivated candidates differ in their (fixed) ideological position and their production function for public goods, and choose which tax rate to propose. We provide conditions under which a unique equilibrium exists. In equilibrium, candidates propose different tax rates, and the extent of economic differentiation is influenced by the distribution and intensity of non-economic preferences in the electorate. In turn, the extent of economic differentiation influences whether parties divide the electorate primarily along economic or social lines. |
| Subjects: | | differentiated candidates policy divergence ideology |
| JEL: | | D72 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49486
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|