Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49486
Authors: 
Krasa, Stefan
Polborn, Mattias
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3503
Abstract: 
How does ideological polarization on non-economic matters influence the size of government? We analyze this question using a differentiated candidates framework: Two office-motivated candidates differ in their (fixed) ideological position and their production function for public goods, and choose which tax rate to propose. We provide conditions under which a unique equilibrium exists. In equilibrium, candidates propose different tax rates, and the extent of economic differentiation is influenced by the distribution and intensity of non-economic preferences in the electorate. In turn, the extent of economic differentiation influences whether parties divide the electorate primarily along economic or social lines.
Subjects: 
differentiated candidates
policy divergence
ideology
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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