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Title:Partial coercion, conditional cooperation, and self-commitment in voluntary contributions to public goods PDF Logo
Authors:Cettolin, Elena
Riedl, Arno
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3556
Abstract:In this paper we experimentally investigate whether partial coercion can in combination with conditional cooperation increase contributions to a public good. We are especially interested in the behavior of the non-coerced populations. The main finding is that in our setting conditional cooperation is not a strong enough force to increase contribution levels. Although, non-coerced subjects rationally adjust their beliefs about contribution behavior of coerced subjects they do not increase their own contributions to the public good accordingly. This points to the limits of the actual strength of conditional cooperation and puts some doubt on the idea that it is crucial in overcoming social dilemma problems.
Subjects:coercion
public goods
commitment
laboratory experiment
JEL:C91
D02
D03
H41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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