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dc.contributor.authorFiva, Jon H.en_US
dc.contributor.authorFolke, Olleen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-14T13:12:22Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-14T13:12:22Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49471-
dc.description.abstractDuverger (1954) noted that changes in electoral systems will have two types of effects: mechanical effects, and reactions of political agents in anticipation of these, which he referred to as psychological effects. It is complicated to empirically separate the two effects since these occur simultaneously. In this paper we use a large set of counterfactual election outcomes to address this issue. Our application is based on a nationwide municipal electoral reform in Norway, which changed the seat allocation method from d'Hondt to modified Sainte-Lagüe. Even though this electoral reform is of a relatively small magnitude, we document substantial psychological effects.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Public Choice 3505en_US
dc.subject.jelC10en_US
dc.subject.jelH70en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwKommunalwahlen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlsystemen_US
dc.subject.stwReformen_US
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitikeren_US
dc.subject.stwPsychologieen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwNorwegenen_US
dc.titleMechanical and psychological effects of electoral reformen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn664383440en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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