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dc.contributor.authorGhosal, Viveken_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-14T13:12:20Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-14T13:12:20Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49470-
dc.description.abstractI present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by competition law enforcement authorities, such as evaluation of M&As or investigation of monopolization (dominance) conduct, should be directly used to investigate and prosecute cartels. Currently, in several jurisdictions, information acquired in, for example, a M&A investigation typically cannot be directly used for a cartel case due to the underlying statutes and the legal and administrative procedures that govern information use. Reviewing the management and corporate strategy literature, I note that M&As form a vital part of firms' core business strategy, with the longer-run strategic aspects being more important. These longer-run strategies could be jeopardized if the firms were engaging in collusion, as the likelihood of detection and prosecution would increase under the proposed rule change, which would punish bad (collusive) behavior. I argue that irrespective of exactly how many cartels are actually prosecuted via this channel, the proposal has the likelihood of creating a meaningful deterrence effect. I also discuss the potential downsides related to Type 1 errors and administrative costs. Overall, I argue that the proposed rule change could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of cartel enforcement, and open an additional front in the fight against hardcore cartels that operate within jurisdictions as well as internationally.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation 3506en_US
dc.subject.jelA10en_US
dc.subject.jelD49en_US
dc.subject.jelK00en_US
dc.subject.jelK14en_US
dc.subject.jelK21en_US
dc.subject.jelL00en_US
dc.subject.jelL40en_US
dc.subject.jelL44en_US
dc.subject.jelL49en_US
dc.subject.jelM00en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcartelsen_US
dc.subject.keywordenforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordlaw and economicsen_US
dc.subject.stwKartellrechten_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsaufsichten_US
dc.subject.stwFusionskontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationen_US
dc.subject.stwSpillover-Effekten_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.titleThe law and economics of enhancing cartel enforcement: Using information from non-cartel investigations to prosecute cartelsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn664384250en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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