Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49383 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 1724
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
According to the harmonic sequence paradox (Blavatskyy 2006), an expected utility decision maker's willingness-to-pay for a gamble whose expected payoffs evolve according to the harmonic series is finite if and only if his marginal utility of additional income becomes zero for rather low payoff levels. Since the assumption of zero marginal utility is implausible for finite payoffs levels, expected utility theory - as well as its standard generalizations such as cumulative prospect theory - are apparently unable to explain a finite willingness-to-pay. The present paper presents first an experimental study of the harmonic sequence paradox. Additionally, it demonstrates that the theoretical argument of the harmonic sequence paradox only applies to time-patient decision makers whereas the paradox is easily avoided if time-impatience is introduced.
Schlagwörter: 
St. Petersburg Paradox
Expected Utility
Time-Preferences
JEL: 
C91
D81
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
943.04 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.