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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48853
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| Title: | | Endogenous enforcement of intellectual property, North-South trade, and growth  |
| Authors: | | Schäfer, Andreas Schneider, Maik T. |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working Paper // Universität Leipzig 96 |
| Abstract: | | While most countries have harmonized intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation, the dispute about the optimal level of IPR-enforcement remains. This paper develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies satisfying the classical North-South assumptions to study (a) IPR-enforcement in a decentralized game and (b) the desired globally-harmonized IPR-enforcement of the two regions. The results are compared to the constrained-efficient enforcement level. Our main insights are: The regions' desired harmonized enforcement levels are higher than their equilibrium choices, however, the gap between the two shrinks with relative market size. While growth rates substiantially increase when IPR-enforcement is harmonized at the North's desired level, our numerical simulation suggests that the South may also benefit in terms of long-run welfare. |
| Subjects: | | Endogenous Growth Intellectual Property Rights Trade Dynamic Game |
| JEL: | | F10 F13 O10 O30 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Universität Leipzig
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