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Working Papers, Universität Leipzig >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48853
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Schäfer, Andreas | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Schneider, Maik T. | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-08-18 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-08-23T12:49:14Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-08-23T12:49:14Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48853 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | While most countries have harmonized intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation, the dispute about the optimal level of IPR-enforcement remains. This paper develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies satisfying the classical North-South assumptions to study (a) IPR-enforcement in a decentralized game and (b) the desired globally-harmonized IPR-enforcement of the two regions. The results are compared to the constrained-efficient enforcement level. Our main insights are: The regions' desired harmonized enforcement levels are higher than their equilibrium choices, however, the gap between the two shrinks with relative market size. While growth rates substiantially increase when IPR-enforcement is harmonized at the North's desired level, our numerical simulation suggests that the South may also benefit in terms of long-run welfare. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Univ., Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät Leipzig | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Working Paper // Universität Leipzig 96 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F10 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F13 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O10 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O30 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Endogenous Growth | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Intellectual Property Rights | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Trade | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Dynamic Game | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Immaterialgüterrechte | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Rechtsdurchsetzung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Nord-Süd-Beziehungen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Neue Wachstumstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wohlfahrtseffekt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Endogenous enforcement of intellectual property, North-South trade, and growth | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 666351384 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:leiwps:96 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Universität Leipzig
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