Universität Leipzig >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Leipzig >
Working Papers, Universität Leipzig >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
| || |
|Title:||Endogenous enforcement of intellectual property, North-South trade, and growth |
Schneider, Maik T.
|Issue Date:||2011 |
|Series/Report no.:||Working Paper // Universität Leipzig 96|
|Abstract:||While most countries have harmonized intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation, the dispute about the optimal level of IPR-enforcement remains. This paper develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies satisfying the classical North-South assumptions to study (a) IPR-enforcement in a decentralized game and (b) the desired globally-harmonized IPR-enforcement of the two regions. The results are compared to the constrained-efficient enforcement level. Our main insights are: The regions' desired harmonized enforcement levels are higher than their equilibrium choices, however, the gap between the two shrinks with relative market size. While growth rates substiantially increase when IPR-enforcement is harmonized at the North's desired level, our numerical simulation suggests that the South may also benefit in terms of long-run welfare.|
Intellectual Property Rights
|Document Type:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||Working Papers, Universität Leipzig|
Download bibliographical data as:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.