Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48735
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dc.contributor.authorBade, Sophieen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-12T09:51:46Z-
dc.date.available2011-08-12T09:51:46Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/48735-
dc.description.abstractThe paper introduces the assumption of costly information acquisition to the theory of mechanism design for matching allocation problems. It is shown that the assumption of endogenous information acquisition greatly changes some of the cherished results in that theory: in particular, the first-best might not be implementable. Moreover, it might not even be possible to implement the second-best through trade. In addition, the paper highlights the use of randomness in setting incentives for efficient learning. The trade-offs among simultaneous and sequential learning and among efficient learning and efficient allocations are discussed.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |xKiel und Hamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2011: Die Ordnung der Weltwirtschaft: Lektionen aus der Krise - Session: Information Economics |xB14-V1en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelD50en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSerial Dictatorship-
dc.subject.keywordHouse Allocation Problems-
dc.subject.keywordEndogenous Information-
dc.titleMatching Allocation Problems with Endogenous Information Acquisitionen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn671640089en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:vfsc11:48735-

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