Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/48710 
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dc.contributor.authorRau, Holger Andreasen
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-12T09:51:15Z-
dc.date.available2011-08-12T09:51:15Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/48710-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the provision of a step-level public good in an experiment. Specifically, we investigate how the order of moves and the introduction of a second step-level affects public-good provision. We find that the sequential-move game improves public-good provision and payoffs. An additional step-level does lead to higher contributions but the effect on public-good provision is ambiguous and insignificant. Based on an existing data set, we calibrate Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model of inequality aversion and find that actual behavior fits remarkably well with these predictions in a quantitative sense, but there are also two contradictions to the model's predictions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |xKiel und Hamburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2011: Die Ordnung der Weltwirtschaft: Lektionen aus der Krise - Session: Experimental Economics I |xA9-V1en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD70en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordExperimental economicsen
dc.subject.keywordsequential playen
dc.subject.keywordstep-level public gooden
dc.titleStep-Level Public Goods: Experimental Evidence-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn671766821en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:vfsc11:48710en

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