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Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2011: Die Ordnung der Weltwirtschaft - Lektionen aus der Krise >

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dc.contributor.authorGrätz, Silviaen_US
dc.contributor.authorDarai, Donjaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-12T09:51:05Z-
dc.date.available2011-08-12T09:51:05Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/48702-
dc.description.abstractWhat makes you a successful cooperator? Using data from the British television game show ``Golden Balls'' we analyze a prisoner's dilemma game and its pre-play. We find that players strategically select their partner for the PD, e.g., they bear in mind whether contestants lied. Players' expectations about the stake size strongly influence the outcome of the PD: The lower the stakes, the more likely players successfully cooperate. Most interestingly, unilateral cooperation is encouraged by mutually promising not to defect and shaking hands on it, but a mere handshake serves as manipulating device and increases successful defection.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Kiel und Hamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2011: Die Ordnung der Weltwirtschaft: Lektionen aus der Krise - Session: Coordination and Cooperation E7-V1en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC93en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleDeterminants of Successful Cooperation in a Face-to-Face Social Dilemmaen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn671872354en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:vfsc11:48702-
Appears in Collections:Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2011: Die Ordnung der Weltwirtschaft - Lektionen aus der Krise

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