Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48600
Authors: 
Heinz, Matthias
Juranek, Steffen
Rau, Holger A.
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
DICE discussion paper 24
Abstract: 
We analyze dictator allocation decisions in an experiment where the recipients have to earn the pot to be divided with a real-effort task. As the recipients move before the dictators, their effort decisions resemble the first move in a trust game. Depending on the recipients' performance, the size of the pot is either high or low. We compare this real-effort treatment to a baseline treatment where the pot is a windfall gain and where a lottery determines the pot size. In the baseline treatment, reciprocity cannot play a role. We find that female dictators show reciprocity and decrease their taking-rates significantly in the real-effort treatment. This treatment effect is larger when female dictators make a decision on recipients who successfully generated a large pot compared to the case where the recipients performed poorly. By contrast, there is no treatment effect with male dictators, who generally exhibit more sefish behavior.
Subjects: 
Gender
Reciprocity
Dictator Game
Real Effort
JEL: 
C72
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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