Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48472
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dc.contributor.authorSchulz, Norberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-18T15:03:52Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-18T15:03:52Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/48472-
dc.description.abstractIn an oligopoly model with switching costs firms have no incentive to discriminate by price (third degree), if the environment is symmetric. This is partly due to the fact that prices decrease unambiguously with price discrimination. In an asymmetric environment a firm enjoying some advantage may well have an incentive to discriminate. In all cases price discrimination increases social surplus. The antitrust treatment of price discrimination thus has to be questioned.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Lehrstuhl für VWL 1 |cWürzburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWürzburg economic papers |x25en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titlePrivate and social incentives to discriminate in oligopolyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn57061161Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wuewep:25-

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