EconStor >
Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg >
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Geldund internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, Universität Würzburg >
W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers, Lst. f. VWL, Geld u. internat. Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, Universität Würzburg >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48472
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSchulz, Norberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-18T15:03:52Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-18T15:03:52Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/48472-
dc.description.abstractIn an oligopoly model with switching costs firms have no incentive to discriminate by price (third degree), if the environment is symmetric. This is partly due to the fact that prices decrease unambiguously with price discrimination. In an asymmetric environment a firm enjoying some advantage may well have an incentive to discriminate. In all cases price discrimination increases social surplus. The antitrust treatment of price discrimination thus has to be questioned.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Lehrstuhl für VWL 1 Würzburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWürzburg economic papers 25en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titlePrivate and social incentives to discriminate in oligopolyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn57061161Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wuewep:25-
Appears in Collections:W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers, Lst. f. VWL, Geld u. internat. Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, Universität Würzburg

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
57061161X.pdf78.01 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.