Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/48472 
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dc.contributor.authorSchulz, Norberten
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-18T15:03:52Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-18T15:03:52Z-
dc.date.issued2000-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/48472-
dc.description.abstractIn an oligopoly model with switching costs firms have no incentive to discriminate by price (third degree), if the environment is symmetric. This is partly due to the fact that prices decrease unambiguously with price discrimination. In an asymmetric environment a firm enjoying some advantage may well have an incentive to discriminate. In all cases price discrimination increases social surplus. The antitrust treatment of price discrimination thus has to be questioned.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Würzburg, Department of Economics |cWürzburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aW.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers |x25en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titlePrivate and social incentives to discriminate in oligopoly-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn57061161Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wuewep:25en

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