Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48466
Authors: 
Beschorner, Patrick F. E.
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Würzburg economic papers 37
Abstract: 
In a two-stage model insurance companies first decide upon risk classification and then compete in prices. I show that the observed heterogeneous behavior of similar firms is compatible with rational behavior. On the deregulated German insurance market individual application of classification schemes induces welfare losses due to cream skimming. Classification costs and pricing above marginal cost can be prevented by common industry-wide loss statistics which already exist to a rudimentary extent. They allow competition to approach Bertrand type. The computation of a mixed-strategy equilibrium for Bertrand competition allows to explain the decrease of industry profit after deregulation.
Subjects: 
Insurance Regulation
Cream Skimming
Bertrand Competition
JEL: 
D82
L51
K23
G22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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